French wings in Ukrainian skies: why Mirage 2000 fighters are not to be underestimated

Ukraine's defense fleet will soon expand with another Western-made fighter jet: France's defense minister recently announced plans to transfer an undisclosed number of Mirage 2000-5 fighters as early as next year. By the end of October, it was reported that only three combat-ready jets in the required configuration were available in France's stockpiles.

When initial speculation emerged about Ukraine receiving these aircraft, expert opinion was divided. Assessments ranged from "a museum piece for disposal" and "will create a 'zoo' in our Air Force, doing more harm than good" to "capable of changing the course of combat."

Liga.Tech explores how this aircraft differs from the F-16, its proven track record in real battles, and the surprises it might hold for adversaries.

Outshining the Falcon

The Korean War marked the successful debut of the world's first jet fighter, the Soviet MiG-15, which posed considerable challenges for UN forces in the skies above the peninsula. Before the conflict ended, Western countries were seriously invested in developing similar jets combining ease of production with the ability to carry heavy weaponry.

France emerged as an early leader in the jet arms race. In 1952, the Air Force command set the task of creating a lightweight multi-role aircraft capable of reaching altitudes of 18 km and speeds up to Mach 1.3. The winning design came from Dassault Aviation (DA), later realized as the Mirage III. This aircraft would become Europe's first multi-role supersonic fighter, establishing the Mirage family of jets.

The Mirage 2000 is the fourth iteration of this series and simultaneously a fourth-generation aircraft, making it a peer of the American F-16 and Soviet Su-27. After modifications, aviation analysts have classified this "Mirage" as Generation 4+.

The development of the Mirage 2000 began in 1965 and was quite challenging. Initially, it was intended as a joint Franco-British aircraft with a variable-geometry wing. But after two years, the French left the project and began experimenting with various concepts, including creating a "mini-Mirage." The British stayed with the concept and, in cooperation with Germany and Italy, developed the multi-role interceptor Panavia Tornado.

In 1975, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway chose the F-16 Fighting Falcon as their new frontline fighter, rejecting the modified Mirage F1. Thus, for DA, developing a superior aircraft became a matter of honor and success in the global aviation market.

The decision to use a delta-wing design for the Mirage 2000 was initially seen as a step backward, as this wing shape had been abandoned in the Mirage F1. This design is advantageous in terms of speed, structural simplicity, low radar visibility, and available space within the fuselage and wings. However, the drawbacks include lower maneuverability, difficulty in low-altitude flights, and a longer takeoff and landing distance.

However, DA engineers managed to modify the delta wing by shifting the center of lift ahead of the center of gravity. This improved the Mirage's maneuverability and reduced takeoff distance.

Like the F-16, the Mirage 2000 employed a fly-by-wire system, which replaced mechanical linkages (cables, etc.) with electronic signals for control inputs. This, along with two-part elevons (control surfaces for altitude and roll) on each wing and automatic two-segment slats, allowed the Mirage 2000 to significantly surpass its predecessors in maneuverability.

The Mirage was powered by the SNECMA M53 engine, enabling it to reach an impressive speed of over Mach 2 (around 2,340 km/h). Aviation-grade aluminum was the primary material used in its construction, with some composite parts made from carbon fiber and titanium. The aircraft featured nine hardpoints, capable of carrying up to six tons of missiles and bombs, with two hardpoints dedicated to additional fuel tanks.

The Mirage 2000 was praised for its agility, reliability, ease of operation and maintenance, and high effectiveness in aerial combat. Additionally, it was cheaper to purchase and maintain than the "Falcon."

The last in the dynasty, but not in battle

Military aviation experts regard the Mirage 2000 as a successful continuation of French traditions in elegant and practical fighter design. In many respects, it had similar characteristics to the F-16, though it lagged in areas like payload capacity. Despite DA's leadership ambitions, the Mirage still achieved considerable export success.

Overall, nine countries, in addition to France, have purchased this aircraft for their air forces. Among them, Egypt, Taiwan, Greece, the UAE, Peru, and India continue to operate it. In 2021, India signed an agreement to buy 21 more Mirages, dispelling any notion of France offloading obsolete equipment to Ukraine for its last battle.

The Mirage 2000 entered service in 1984 and has since been modified eight times. One of the most notable modifications was the Mirage 2000N (for Nucléaire), capable of carrying cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The Mirage thus became not only a primary fighter but also part of France's deterrence forces.

In the late 1980s, the Mirage 2000's age became apparent, and export sales declined. In response, DA began a major upgrade effort with private investment, resulting in the Mirage 2000-5, which had improved avionics (all onboard electronics) and air-to-air missiles, the MICA series.

A significant upgrade was the RDY radar from Thales, which allowed for tracking and attacking four separate targets simultaneously with missiles. Additionally, the aircraft was outfitted with a new glass cockpit (inherited from the more modern Rafale fighter) and an updated countermeasures system and missile warning technology.

The upgrade significantly boosted the Mirage's position in the export market: just two years after the Mirage 2000-5's first flight in 1990, Taiwan's Air Force ordered nearly fifty units, while Qatar purchased ten. Ukraine will receive the Mirage 2000-5 variant.

The French continued improving the Mirage, and by the late 1990s, they released an enhanced Mirage 2000-5 Mark 2, equipped with the RDY-2 radar, enabling all-weather, day-and-night attacks while remaining less visible to enemy radars.

A new multipurpose MDPU replaced the old onboard computers, and the TOTEM 3000 inertial navigation system used lasers instead of mechanics, significantly improving accuracy. The first customer of the Mirage 2000-5 Mk 2 was the UAE, followed by the Greek Air Force.

French Mirages have a solid record of combat use. They participated in every operation involving the French Air Force: Operation Desert Storm, conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the war in Afghanistan. Even after production ended in 2006, they didn't retire. Mirage 2000-5s were used in strikes during the war in Libya, the Syrian civil war, and Operation Serval (a series of airstrikes against Islamist forces in Mali). This spring, Mirages downed two Houthi drones over the Red Sea.

The Indian Air Force actively used these fighters during the Kargil Conflict—border skirmishes with Pakistan in 1999. Primarily, they were used for air defense and to protect strike aircraft.

Interestingly, the Mirages have faced off in real combat against their American counterpart: in 1996, a Greek Mirage 2000-5 shot down a Turkish F-16 over the Aegean Sea during heightened tensions over the ownership of two rocky, uninhabited islands. The incident highlighted that aircraft specifications alone don't determine outcomes, but rather the circumstances of their use and pilot skill.

A Mirage 4000 was intended as a successor to the Mirage 2000. It was 74% heavier than its predecessor and was realized as only one prototype. Saudi Arabia was a potential buyer, but interest waned, and the project was ultimately canceled. Some of its developments were incorporated into the Rafale (French for "squall"), which replaced the Mirage.

A "zoo" or a new opportunity?

Many Ukrainian military analysts argue that the ideal scenario for the Defense Forces is to gradually replace the current fleet of MiG-29, Su-27, Su-25, and Su-24MR with a single Western-made multi-role fighter—preferably the American F-16.

This is why the idea of receiving additional fighters from partners, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon or Sweden's Gripen, has been met with skepticism. Critics argue these would add complexity without providing the benefits of a unified fleet, as "they are inferior to the Falcons and would create an unnecessary 'zoo' in the Air Force."

Using two Western fighters will indeed pose logistical challenges. In Europe alone, nine countries have recently operated or continue to operate the Falcons, meaning there is no shortage of instructors for pilots and ground crew, nor any issue finding parts. In the case of the Mirage 2000, such specialists are available only in France and Greece. This would also lead to a dispersal of resources: some pilots and mechanics, who are already in short supply, would have to be specifically assigned to work with the Mirages.

However, the simultaneous use of both the F-16 and Mirage 2000 is not unprecedented: Egypt, Taiwan, the UAE, and Greece all operate both models. Greece acquired them in a single year as part of its air force modernization plan. For ease of operation and logistics, they are generally based at different airfields.

The Mirage acquisition has clear advantages. The transfer of the F-16s involved a coalition of countries that had to negotiate the quantity, types of weaponry, and training for personnel, and then obtain clearance from the U.S., the aircraft's manufacturer.

Training posed a particular challenge: in May, it was revealed that Kyiv was ready to send 30 pilots to Arizona for training, but only 12 could be accommodated there. A similar issue arose with training bases in Denmark and Romania.

By contrast, in the case of the Mirages, no time needs to be spent on international negotiations, as only France is responsible. This explains why only six months passed between the first news of a possible transfer and official confirmation.

Another advantage of these French "birds" is their impressive arsenal. The Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles, currently undergoing integration for the Su-24, are already standard weaponry for the Mirage 2000. Notably, high-precision Hammer glide bombs, which France began supplying in March, are also compatible.

Using these weapons on their "native" platform will increase effectiveness, allowing for deeper strikes into enemy territory. Moreover, the Thales system significantly outperforms the electronic warfare systems used by the Su-24.

The Mirages can also carry MBDA MICA-RF/EM air-to-air missiles, which are equivalent to the American AIM-120 AMRAAM. Although they fall short in range, they are more effective at engaging enemy targets at the maximum possible distance.

Based on the previous experience of using the 2000-5 in NATO missions, they will make an ideal escort for the Swedish Saab 340 AWACS aircraft planned for delivery to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. If they can be linked in real-time, this will significantly enhance the capabilities of the French fighters.

Military observer Kyrylo Danylchenko describes the Mirage 2000-5 as a versatile aircraft. However, much will depend on the specific version being supplied. It could serve as an air-defense aircraft, intercepting enemy cruise missiles and drones, or as part of coastal defense using Exocet anti-ship missiles. Tactical link capabilities are also crucial—Link 16 enables interaction with the Patriot missile defense system.

Will the Mirage shift the course of combat

The Mirage 2000-5 is unlikely to be a game-changer that radically alters the course of combat. However, in a situation where the front line stretches roughly 1,000 km and the opponent actively uses glide bombs, any reinforcement of Ukraine's air force will be beneficial. Especially as most of Ukraine's Soviet-built airframes are nearing the end of their service life, with limited options for renewal—Eastern European nations are also gradually transitioning to Western-made aircraft.

For France, this is a good opportunity to demonstrate its role as a reliable security partner and to strengthen its position as a major arms exporter. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, countries in the so-called Global South are less inclined to purchase Russian aircraft due to the "toxicity" of Moscow's regime or simply because of disappointment in their combat effectiveness under real battlefield conditions.

All wars are ultimately won on land, but an essential component is the ability to neutralize the enemy at sea and in the air. The Defense Forces have already performed well on land; now it's time to tackle the skies.